TY - JOUR T1 - Optimizing O&M Contracts for Distributed Electricity Generation Units: Principal- Agent Problem TT - قراردادهای بهینه بهره‌برداری از مولدهای مقیاس کوچک تولید برق: مسئله کارگزار- کارفرما JF - epprjournal JO - epprjournal VL - 7 IS - 1 UR - http://epprjournal.ir/article-1-771-en.html Y1 - 2021 SP - 131 EP - 148 KW - Principal-Agent Problem KW - Moral Hazard KW - Adverse Selection KW - Asymmetric Information KW - Payment Schema N2 - In restructured power sector atmosphere, ownership of generation segment has been offered to private sector while another private sector will be responsible for operation and maintenance of machineries generally over an internal contract. A systematic analysis of their relationship needs accurate study of the contract between parties since the most important factor which form an interaction between parties is their contract. However, asymmetric information phenomena and its sequels, i.e. moral hazard and adverse selection, are obstacles toward favorable designed contract. In this paper, we are trying to analyze relationship between owner and operator of DG (distributed generator) within a contract and over the framework of game theory with emphasis on moral hazard and adverse selection simultaneously. As a result, we are trying to design a set of optimal contracts for offering to operator. The contracts are designed within mathematical approach in a way to maximize owner’s utility while reaching maximum motivation and partnership of operator. Finally, we try to simulate the result and evaluate the accuracy of theoretical assumptions. The result of study indicates how owners of generators can design a set of contracts for offering to possible operators, knowing specifications of their community. M3 ER -